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ABSTRACT
The paper develops a model with lumpy setup costs of new investment, which govern the flows of
FDI. Foreign investment decisions are two-fold: whether to export FDI and, if so, how much. The
first decision is governed by total profitability considerations, whereas the second is governed by
marginal profitability considerations. A positive productivity shock in the host country may, on the
one hand, increases the volume of the desired FDI flows to the host country but, on the other hand,
somewhat counter-intuitively, lowers the likelihood of the making new FDI flows by the source
country, at all. Every country is potentially both a source for FDI flows to several host countries, and
a host for FDI flows from several source countries. Thus, the model could generate two-way FDI
flows, but not all source-host FDI flows get realized. We employ a sample of 24 OECD countries,
over the period 1981-1998. We observe many pairs of countries with no FDI flows between them.
Zero reported flows could indicate measurement errors, or true zeroes that are due to fixed costs (in
situations where they dominate marginal productivity conditions). Empirical literature on the
determinants of FDI flows which uses the Tobit procedure aims at a correction for measurement
errors provides nevertheless biased estimates in the presence of fixed costs. By employing the
Heckman selection procedure, we demonstrate how to get unbiased estimates of the fixed-costs
effects on FDI flows. Controlling for the selection into source-host pairs of countries, and for time
and country fixed effects, the paper sheds light on the importance of several covariates, such as
income per capita, education, and financial risk ratings as key determinants of volume of FDI flows.
While the coefficients of both the source- and host-country average years of schooling are positive
and significant in the flow equation, the magnitude of the source country coefficient is more than
twice that of the host country. That is, the richer the source country is relative to the host country,
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Abstract
The paper develops a model with lumpy setup costs of new investment, which
govern the ￿ ows of FDI. Foreign investment decisions are two-fold: whether to ex-
port FDI and, if so, how much. The ￿rst decision is governed by total pro￿tability
considerations, whereas the second is governed by marginal pro￿tability consider-
ations. A positive productivity shock in the host country may, on the one hand,
increases the volume of the desired FDI ￿ ows to the host country but, on the other
hand, somewhat counter-intuitively, lowers the likelihood of the making new FDI
￿ ows by the source country, at all. Every country is potentially both a source for
FDI ￿ ows to several host countries, and a host for FDI ￿ ows from several source
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1countries. Thus, the model could generate two-way FDI ￿ ows, but not all source-
host FDI ￿ ows get realized. We employ a sample of 24 OECD countries, over the
period 1981-1998. We observe many pairs of countries with no FDI ￿ ows between
them. Zero reported ￿ ows could indicate measurement errors, or true zeroes that
are due to ￿xed costs (in situations where they dominate marginal productivity
conditions). Empirical literature on the determinants of FDI ￿ ows which uses the
Tobit procedure aims at a correction for measurement errors provides nevertheless
biased estimates in the presence of ￿xed costs. By employing the Heckman selection
procedure, we demonstrate how to get unbiased estimates of the ￿xed-costs e⁄ects
on FDI ￿ ows. Controlling for the selection into source-host pairs of countries, and
for time and country ￿xed e⁄ects, the paper sheds light on the importance of several
covariates, such as income per capita, education, and ￿nancial risk ratings as key
determinants of volume of FDI ￿ ows. While the coe¢ cients of both the source-
and host-country average years of schooling are positive and signi￿cant in the ￿ ow
equation, the magnitude of the source country coe¢ cient is more than twice that
of the host country. That is, the richer the source country is relative to the host
country, the larger are the FDI ￿ ows which occur between them.
1 Introduction
The paper develops an international capital ￿ ows￿model, with lumpy set up costs of new
investment which govern the ￿ ow of FDI.1 The model works like this. First, a potential
FDI investor decides how much she would like to invest. This decision is governed by
marginal pro￿tability considerations so as to equate marginal factor productivity to factor
prices (that is, the standard ￿rst-order conditions). In the econometric terminology, this
decision is described by a ￿ ow (gravity) equation. Second, because of ￿xed costs of new
investments, the potential FDI investor must also decide wether to carry out at all new
1The international trade literature appeals often to ￿xed costs. These costs play a very important
role in determining the extent of trade-based foreign direct investment through the reallocation of capital
across industries and the emergence of comparative advantages; see Zhang and Markusen (1999), Carr,
Markusen and Maskum (2001), and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004).
2investments. This decision is governed by the total (rather than the marginal) pro￿tability
of the new investment. In the econometric terminology, the decision is described by a
so-called participation equation. In the model, every country is potentially both a source
for FDI ￿ ows to several host countries, and a host for FDI ￿ ows from several source
countries. But because of ￿xed costs, some of the source-host country pairs are inactive.
In the presence of ￿xed costs, a productivity shock in the host country may also, on the
one hand, increases the volume of the desired FDI ￿ ows to this country; as expected; but,
on the other hand, and somewhat counter-intuitively, the shock lowers the likelihood of
making new FDI ￿ ows at all, by the source country.
Our sample consists of 24 OECD countries over the period 1981-1998.2 When one
looks at data on international capital ￿ ows of FDI, one is immediately struck by the lack
of ￿ ows from some source countries to many host countries. Only 17 countries are a source
for FDI out￿ ows, and each one of them exports FDI to only a few host countries. Thus
there is a prima facia evidence for the existence of ￿xed setup costs of investment that
shut o⁄the potential of ￿small￿capital ￿ ows, even though they may have been called for
by marginal productivity conditions.
Previous empirical literature on the determinants of FDI ￿ ows frequently make use
of the Tobit procedure. But this procedure, which is proper to handle measurement er-
rors, reduces in essence, the ￿ ow and participation equations into just one equation. In
contrast, by employing Heckman (1979) selection procedure, the two equations that are
jointly estimated yield estimates that provide insight about the two equations separately.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the two equations cannot be combined, as in theory,
exogenous shocks have con￿ icting e⁄ects on the likelihood of FDI ￿ ows and their mag-
nitudes. Put it econometrically, the errors terms in the two equations are negatively
correlated, and this implies that the Tobit procedure yields biased estimates. Control-
ling for the selection into source-host pairs of countries, and for time and country ￿xed
2In Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2003) we employ a sample of 45 countries, both developed and
developing countries. But the OECD data set is inacurate about the exports of FDI to non-OECD
countries.
3e⁄ects, the paper sheds light on the importance of several covariates, such as income per
capita, education, and ￿nancial risk ratings as key determinants of volume of FDI ￿ ows.
While the coe¢ cients of both the source- and host-country average years of schooling are
positive and signi￿cant in the ￿ ow equation, the magnitude of the source country coe¢ -
cient is more than twice that of the host country. That is, the richer the source country
is relative to the host country, the larger are the FDI ￿ ows which occur between them.
Our ￿ndings therefore suggest that capital does ￿ ow from a high income country to a
low income country, and from countries with high average years of schooling to countries
with low average years of schooling, in the way suggested when one looks at marginal
productivity conditions alone.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model of ￿xed
setup costs of foreign direct investment. Section 3 presents the econometric approach.
The data are described in Section 4. Estimation results of the determinants of FDI ￿ ows,
and whether source-host ￿ ows are formed at all, are presented in Section 5. The results
are interpreted in Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Marginal Pro￿tability Versus Total Pro￿tability
We employ a ￿lumpy￿adjustment cost for new investment, in the form of a ￿xed setup
cost of investment.3 This speci￿cation, which has been recently supported empirically
by Caballero and Engel (1999, 2000), creates a situation in which FDI decisions become
two-fold decisions: whether to export FDI at all, and, if so, how much. These decisions
are pair-wise: that is, they are made by each source country with respect to each host
country, as the ￿lumpy￿adjustment cost is speci￿c for each source-host pair. In our
setup of exogenous shocks can a⁄ect these two decisions in opposite directions. That
3Evidently, this speci￿cation gives rise to economies of scale. Such economies either in the production
or investment technologies are also a key contributor to the gains from trade and economic integration.
For example, based on estimates taken from a partial equilibrium analysis, the Cecchini (1988) Report
assessed that the gains from taking advantage of economies of scale will constitute about 30 percent of
the total gains from the European market integration in 1992.
4is, a shock can lower the likelihood of exporting FDI from a certain source country to a
certain host country; but, if such an export is carried out, its magnitude is even higher.
Consider a representative industry in a given host country (H), in a world of free
capital mobility which ￿xes the world rate of interest, denoted by r. There is a single
good which serves both for consumption and investment. For simplicity, suppose that
￿rms in this industry, all identical, last for two periods. The initial stock of capital is
denoted by K0
H. If the ￿rm invests I in the ￿rst period, it augments its capital stock
to K0
H + I and its gross output in the second period will be AHF(K;L), where F(￿) is a
concave production function, L is the labor input, and AH is a productivity factor.
We assume that there exists a ￿xed setup cost of investment. For simplicity, assume
that this ￿xed cost is generated by a ￿xed input (LC
H) of domestic labor. Thus, the ￿xed
cost is equal to WHLC
H, where WH is the wage rate in the host country. In order for
the ￿rm to be able to incur such a setup cost, we assume that, due to some (suppressed)
￿xed factor, F(￿) exhibits diminishing returns to scale in K and L, that is F is strictly
concave. Thus, the implied average cost curve is U-shaped, which is consistent with
perfect competition that we assume.
Consider a representative ￿rm which does invest in the ￿rst period an amount I =
K ￿ K0







AHF(K;L) ￿ wHL + K
1 + r







(For simplicity, it is assumed that capital does not depreciate).
The demand of such a ￿rm for K and L are denoted by K+(AH;WH;LC
H) and
L+(AH;WH;LC
H), respectively, they are de￿ned by the marginal productivity conditions
AHFK(K;L0 = r (2)
and
AHFL(K;L) = w (3)
Note, however, that the ￿rm may choose not to invest at all (that is, to stick to its
existing stock of capital K0
H) and avoid the lumpy setup cost WHLC
H. In this case its
labor input, denoted by L￿(AH;wH;LC
H) is de￿ned by:
5AHFL(K
0
H;L) = wH: (4)
In this case its present value is:
V


















That is, the ￿rm makes the amount of investment that is called for by the marginal
productivity conditions (2) and (3), if and only if some global [condition (6)] is met. We
assume that labor is con￿ned within national borders. Denoting the country￿ s endowment
of labor by L0




H if V +(AH;wH;LC
H) = V ￿(AH;wH)
L￿(AH;wH) = L0
H if V +(AH;wH;LC





This market clearance equation determines the wage rate in the host country as a
function WH(AH) of the productivity factor (and other exogenous factors, such as L0
H,
which are kept constant and are therefore suppressed).
Note that no similar market clearance condition is speci￿ed for capital, as we assume
that capital is f reely mobile internationally and its return is ￿xed at r.
We now turn to discuss FDI ￿ ows from the source country S to the host country
H. We treat as FDI the investment of source-country entrepreneurs in the acquisition
of host country ￿rms. Suppose that the source country entrepreneurs are endowed with
some ￿ intangible￿capital, or know-how, stemming from their specialization or expertise
in the industry at hand. We model this comparative advantage by assuming that the
lumpy setup cost of investment in the host country, when investment is done by the source
country entrepreneurs (FDI investors) is only L￿C
H which is below LC
H, the lumpy setup cost
6of investment when carried out by the host country direct investors. This means that the
foreign direct investors can bid up the direct investors of the host country in the purchase
of the investing ￿rms in the host country. The representative ￿rm is purchased at its value
which is V +[AH;(wH);L￿C
H ]. This essentially assumes that competition among the foreign
direct investors pushes the price of the acquired ￿rm to its maximized value. Thus, the
FDI investors shift all the gains from their lower setup cost to the host-country original
owners of the ￿rm. The new owners also invest an amount K+[AH;wH(AH);L￿C
H ;K0
H ]
to expand the capital stock of the acquired the ￿rm. On the other hand, if condition (6)
does not hold then there will be no FDI ￿ ows from S to H. Thus, aggregate foreign
direct investment is equal to:
FDI =
8
> > > <
> > > :
V +[AH;wH(AH);L￿C
H ] + K+[AH;wH(AH);L￿C




H ] = V ￿[AH;wH(AH)]
0 if V +[AH;wH(AH)L￿C
H ) < V ￿[AH;wH(AH)]
(8)
The model thus suggests that if the productivity factor (AH) is su¢ ciently high, and/or
the wage rate (wH) is su¢ ciently low, and/or the setup cost (wHL￿C
H ) is su¢ ciently low,
then FDI ￿ ows from country S to country H are positive. Otherwise, the ￿ ow of FDI
from S to H is zero.
Recall the model￿ s special feature is the two-fold mechanism of FDI decisions. First,
one decides how much to invest abroad while ignoring the ￿xed setup cost. Second a
decision is made whether to invest at all, while taking into account this cost. The hallmark
of our empirical approach is based on the two equations (conditions) that govern these
decisions. First, ignoring the setup cost, the FDI ￿ ows from Country S to country H















That is, the quantity of investment (K+) and the acquisition price (V +) are governed by
the marginal productivity conditions (2) and (3). Second, the question whether FDI ￿ ows




H ] ￿ V
￿[AH;wH(AH)] = 0: (10)
Consider now the e⁄ect of an increase in the host country￿ s productivity factor AH.
Suppose initially that the wage rate in the host country (wH) is ￿xed [that is, ignore the
labor market clearance condition in equation (7)]. An increase in AH raises the quantity
of new investment (K+), if investment is at all carried out, the acquisition price (V +)
that FDI investors pay, and the amount of FDI; see the appendix A. It also raises the
demand for labor in the host country; see also appendix A. This will raise the wage rate
wH in the host country (and the ￿xed setup cost wHL￿C
H ), thereby countering the above
e⁄ects on K+, V +, and FDI. With a unique equilibrium, the initial e⁄ects of the increase
in AH are likely to dominate the subsequent counter e⁄ects of the rise in wH, so that FDI
still rises.4
Thus, an increase in the host country￿ s productivity factor AH raises the ￿ ow volume
of FDI from S to H that is governed by the ￿ ow equation. But at the same time, the
rise in AH increases also the value of the lumpy setup cost wH(AH)L￿C
H . Thus, it may
weaken the advantage of carrying out positive FDI ￿ ows from S to H at all. In other
words, the gap between V + and V ￿ in the participation equation narrows down. Thus,
a positive productivity shock (unobserved in the data) raises the observed FDI ￿ ows in
the ￿ ow equation and, at the same time, may lower the likelihood of observing positive
FDI ￿ ows at all. In other words, the model may generate a negative correlation in the
data between the residuals of the ￿ ow and participation equations.
4However, with ￿xed setup cost the equilibrium need not be unique, and an increase in AH may,
somewhat counter-intuitively, reduce FDI, possibly even to zero. For a similar phenomenon, see Razin,
Sadka and Coury (2003).
83 The Econometric Approach
The preceding section presents a model of bilateral foreign direct investment ￿ ows dis-
tinguished by lumpy setup costs of investment.5 Our empirical investigation is in the
tradition of the often used gravity models,6 but with adjustments for a selection bias of
all potential country pairs into source and host countries. With n countries in the sam-
ple, there are potentially n(n ￿ 1) pairs of source-host (s ￿ h) countries. In fact, as we
show in the data section below, the actual number of s ￿ h pairs is smaller. Therefore,
the selection into s ￿ h pairs, which is naturally endogenous, cannot be ignored; that is,
this selection cannot be taken as exogenous, which has been a standard practice in most
gravity models.
Denote by Yi;j;t the ￿ ow of FDI from source country i to host country j in period t:
The corresponding FDI ￿ ows from source country j to host country i are denoted by Yj;i;t:
Note that with this notation, Yi;j;t almost always non-negative.7 But, it may well be zero,
5Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) pose the question of how a source country can simultaneously
make both FDI out￿ ows and exports goods to the same host country. Their answer rests on productivity
heterogeneity within the source country, and di⁄erences in the setup costs associated with FDI and
exports. Their explanation is thus geared toward ￿rm-level decisions on exports and FDI in the source
country.
6Gravity models postulate that bilateral international ￿ ows (goods, FDI, etc.) between any two
economies are positively related to the size of the two economies (e.g., population, GDP), and negatively
related to the distance (physical or other such as tari⁄ barriers, information asymmetries, etc.) between
them. For instance, using population as the size variable, Loungani, Mody and Razin (2002) ￿nd that
imports are less than proportionately related to the host country population, while they are close to
proportionately related to the source country population. Correspondingly, FDI ￿ ows increase by more
than proportionately with both the source and the host-country populations. For early works with
gravity models of international trade in goods, see Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Eichengreen and Irwin
(1998).
7This ignores rare cases of FDI and ￿ ows from country i to country j being negative, when investors
from country i liquidate their investment in country j in the aggregate. For instance, out￿ ows from
the U.S. to Finland, Japan, New Zealand and Spain wee all negative in 1991. We take care of negative
out￿ows in our empirical approach by allowing for two types of lumpy adjustment costs: one for setting
up new investments (positive ￿ ows) and another one for liquidating existing investments (negative ￿ ows).
9because typically, in a global economy, there are only a few countries which signi￿cantly
export FDI to all, or most countries.
The existence of a setup cost of investment makes investment ￿lumpy￿ . This means
that the conventional determinants of FDI ￿ ows (such as standard marginal productivity
conditions) have to generate a su¢ ciently large infra-marginal pro￿ts, so as to surpass a
certain unobserved threshold. Otherwise, the observed FDI ￿ ows are practically zero. We
argue that the sub-sample of FDI source countries is not a random sample of the countries
in the global economy, if setup costs play a signi￿cant role in the determination of FDI
￿ ows. We now develop a simple econometric approach to study the e⁄ect of setup costs
and correct for selection bias in the analysis of FDI ￿ ows.8
3.1 The Participation Equation
To estimate the gravity FDI ￿ ow model, and to identify the role of setup costs, the
statistical model takes full advantage of the well-known Heckman￿ s selection model [see
Heckman (1979) and Kyriazidou (1996)].
To simplify, but without losing generality, let us assume that, in an imaginary world
with no setup costs, potential FDI ￿ ows (Yi;j;t)exhibit the following linear form:
Yi;j;t = XF;i;j;t￿ + UF;i;j;t; (11)
where XF;i;j;t stands for a vector of observed variables that potentially explain the pattern
of FDI ￿ ows (hence the F subscript). This equation is the analogue of equation (9) in
We correct for liquidation in Table 4.
8Correction for selection bias is rare in international economics literature. Notable exceptions are
Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2003) and Smarzyska and Wei (2001). Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmuk-
ler applied the Heckman selection model in estimating the average maturity of sovereign debt. They take
into account the incidental truncation of the data, since the average maturity is available only for coun-
tries which issue bonds to the world market. The missing observations cannot be treated as zero maturity.
They show, as expected, that countries with weak macroeconomic stance are less likely to issue bonds.
In this case the problem reduces to be the standard Tobin model. Smarzyska and Wei applied Heckman
method to study the e⁄ects of corruption on FDI in transition economies.
10the preceding section. Such variables are, for example, per-capita income di⁄erentials
between country i and country j (re￿ ecting di⁄erences in the capital-labor ratio), as well
as, language, geographical distance, legal system, and communication or transportation
costs. The vector ￿ represents the ceteris paribus e⁄ect of Xi;j;t on Yj;i;t:
The error term UF;i;j;t is a composite of (i) an unobserved time invariant heterogeneity
(￿i;j); which re￿ ects, persistent gaps between, for instance, the wage in the i source and




, re￿ ecting both deviations from the ￿long-run￿wage gap (￿"i;j;t); as well as other
￿ uctuations in macroeconomic policy, political events, etc., that are unique to the i ￿ j
source-host pair.
Let Zi;j;t be a latent variable, which represents pro￿ts from the direct investment
made in host country j, by the ￿rms in the source country i; in period t. To simplify,
we assume that pro￿ts are a linear function of the ￿ ow of FDI, which takes the form
~ Zi;j;t ￿ Yi;j;t ￿ Ci;j;t , where Ci;j;t is the setup cost. De￿ne Zi;j;t = ~ Zi;j;t=￿ ~ Z , where ￿ ~ Z is
the standard deviation of ~ Z. We further assume that Zi;j;t exhibits the following linear
form:
Zi;j;t = X2;i;j;t￿ + Vi;j;t; (12)
where X2;i;j;t and ￿ are a regressor row vector and a coe¢ cient vector, which a⁄ect the
normalized pro￿ts, respectively, and Vi;j;t is the error term respectively. Note that the
variables in the vector for X1 are all included in the vector X2. But vector X2 includes
also ￿xed-cost variables. In a random sample, we assume that the classical assumptions,
regarding the error term, hold. We further assume that the error terms are normally
distributed:
Ui;j;t ￿ N(0; ￿
2
U);
Vi;j;t ￿ N(0;1): (13)
We also assume that the error terms Ui;j;t and Vi;j;t follow a bivariate normal distribution:





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2
U ￿ ￿ ￿U
￿ ￿ ￿U 1
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
; (14)
where ￿ is the correlation coe¢ cient between the cross-equation error terms.
3.1.1 Setup Costs and Selection Bias
The (statistical) population-regression function for equation (11) is:
E (Yi;j;t j XF;i;j;t) = XF;i;j;t￿: (15)
Many previous studies aimed at estimating the e⁄ects of X on Y , in the context of
international capital mobility, typically ignore the e⁄ect of the unobserved setup costs on
the (observed) capital ￿ ows. According to our model, FDI ￿ ows (Yi;j;t) are positive, if











Note that whereas Zi;j;t is not observed, the binary variable Di;j;t is indeed observed.
Assuming that the errors in the underlying latent equation are distributed normally then
the probability setup for the probit equation exhibits the following form.
Pr(Di;j;t = 1 j ￿) = Pr(X2;i;j;t￿ ￿ ￿Vi;j;t) = ￿(X2;i;j;t￿): (17)
where ￿ is the cdf of the unit normal distribution.
Therefore, the regression function for the sub-sample of countries for which we do
indeed observe positive FDI ￿ ows is:
E(Yi;j;t j Xi;j;t; Di;j;t = 1) = Xi;j;t￿ + E(Ui;j;t j Xi;j;t; Di;j;t = 1) (18)
Note that the last term, the conditional expectation of Ui;j;t does no longer equal to zero.
Furthermore, it depends on Xi;j;t, thus upsetting the classical assumptions concerning
regression functions when applied to random samples.
12To see this, one can substitute equations (12) and (16) into equation (17) to get:
E(Yi;j;t jXi;j;t; Di;j;t = 1) = Xi;j;t￿ + E(Ui;j;tjVi;j;t ￿ ￿Xi;j;t￿): (19)
Because Ui;j;t and Vi;j;t follow a bivariate normal distribution with correlation ￿ and
with variances ￿2
U and ￿2
V, respectively, it follows that the expected volume of FDI ￿ ows
from the source country i into the host country j in equation (18) is equal to:
E(Yi;j;t j Xi;j;t; Di;j;t = 1) = Xi;j;t￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿U ￿ ￿i;j;t; (20)
where the inverse Mill￿ s ratio, ￿i;j;t, is de￿ned by:







and where ￿ and ￿ are the unit normal density and the cumulative distribution functions,
respectively. The bias (in the population ) term is equal to the partial derivative of the
conditional expectations of U with respect to X: That is:
bias = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿U ￿ ￿i;j;t; (22)
where ￿i;j;t is a positive number.9
Figure 1 provides the intuition for the case where ￿ > 0. Suppose, for instance, that
Xi;j;t measures the per-capita income di⁄erential between the ith source country and the
jth potential host country, holding all other variables constant, namely per-capita income
di⁄erentials between the ith source country and all the rest of the countries. Our theory
predicts that parameter ￿ is positive in this case. This is shown by the upward sloping
line AB. Note that this slope is an estimate of the ￿true￿underlying e⁄ect of Xi;j;t on
Yi;j;t. But, recall that ￿ ows could be equal to zero if the set up cost are su¢ ciently high.
The capital-￿ ow threshold derived from the setup costs is shown as line TT￿in Figure 1.
9Let ￿ = ￿Xi;j;t￿: Then the partial derivative of the inverse Mills ratio is:
@￿(￿)
@a
= ￿i;j;t = ￿(￿)[￿(￿) ￿ ￿];
so that ￿i;j;t > 0:
13However, recall that the data include only those country pairs for which Yi;j;t is positive.
This sub-sample is, therefore, no longer random . Moreover, as equation (12) makes clear
the selection of country pairs into this sub-sample depends on the vector Xi;j;t:
To see this, suppose, for instance, that for high values of Xi;j;t (the speci￿c level XH in
Figure 1) i-j pair-wise FDI ￿ ows are all positive. That is, for all pairs of countries potential
Yi;j;t are higher than the threshold line. Thus, the observed average, for Xi;j;t = XH is
also equal to the conditional population average, point R on the line AB. However, this
does not hold for low values of Xi;j;t (denoted by XL). For those i-j pairs we observe
positive values of Yi;j;t only in a non-random sample of the population. For instance,
point S is excluded from the observed sub-sample of positive FDI ￿ ows. consequently, as
predicted by our model, we observe only those with low setup cost (namely high Vi;j;t),
among those with low Xi;j;t :As seen in Figure 1, the observed conditional average is at
point M
0; which lies above point M: The sub-sample OLS regression line is shown by the
line A
0B
0, which understates the in￿ uence of the income per capita di⁄erentials on the
￿ ows of FDI.
3.1.2 Selection Bias: Setup Costs Versus Measurement Errors
There is a long tradition in the international economics literature of log-linearizing the
capital ￿ ow gravity model, and estimating the parameters of interest by ordinary least
squares (OLS). In these statistical models the gravitational force can be very small, but
not zero, whereas FDI ￿ ows for a i ￿ j source-host pair of countries is often zero. The
empirical literature developed after Tinbergen (1962) has often either ignored pairs with
no FDI ￿ ows, or treated these cases as measurement errors, or as literally indicating zero
￿ows.10 This view is consistent with models that ignore the role of setup costs. In such
models pairs with zero ￿ ows do indeed represent zero ￿ ows; or they re￿ ect measurement
errors (which are common with a small volume of capital ￿ ows).11
10Recently, Silva and Tenreyro (2003) proposed the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator to
deal with zero values in the bilateral trade models.
11Note that if measurement errors (in the Yi;j;t) are not correlated with the explanatory variables, then
the estimated parameters are not biased; although they are imprecisely estimated.
14In our theoretical model, setup costs play an important role in determining whether
a source country i invest directly in a host country j. Moreover, the model predicts
that there well could be a negative correlation between the error term in the FDI ￿ ows
equation and the error term in the participation equation.
This prediction of the model distinguishes between the "setup cost model" and the
￿measurement errors hypothesis". While the the ￿measurement errors hypothesis" is
consistent only with a positive ￿, the "setup cost model" is consistent also with a negative
￿.
3.1.3 Tobit and Setup Costs
The Tobit model [see Tobin (1958)] has been often used in the empirical international
trade literature [e.g., Carr, Markusen and Muskus (2001)]. The Tobit model is originally
developed to deal with situations were negative, or small positive values of the dependent
variable in the data are reported (censured) as zero values, thus arti￿cially distorting the
sample distribution. However, the Tobit model ignores setup costs. Let Y ￿
i;j;t denote the
desired FDI ￿ ows from i to j in period t:
Y
￿
i;j;t = Xi;j;t￿ + Ui;j;t; (23)
Note that Y ￿
i;j;t could be negative (for instance, when the rate of return di⁄erential
works in favor of country i). The latent variable Y ￿
i;j;t is observed only if it is positive.








The population regression function for equation (11) is:













15Comparing the set of equations (9) - (10) and the set of equations (240 - (25), the Tobit
model can be viewed as a special case of the Heckman model for the particular case where
￿ = 1. In this case, the ￿ ow equation serves also as the participation equation (up to a
scale). Because the only di⁄erence between the participation and the ￿ ow equations is in
the role played by the setup costs, the Tobit model is the correct model under the null
hypothesis of no setup costs.
Endogeneity of the explanatory variables The large fraction of country pairs with
zero ￿ ows makes it clear that the selection into source and host countries is the key issue
the empirical framework must address. Yet, this is not the only problem that needs
to be addressed in the empirical implementation. So far we treated the explanatory
variables as exogenous to the FDI ￿ ows. Although bilateral FDI ￿ ows are only a subset
of the international capital ￿ ows that enter in the host countries from all sources, we
should not ignore the possibility that foreign direct investment ￿ ows from source country
i to host country j may a⁄ect both economies. If such in￿ uence exists, the explanatory
variables, such as GDP per capita in the source and the host countries, are expected to be
correlated with the error terms in the ￿ ow and in the participation equations. We address
this endogeneity problem by instrumenting our explanatory variables using lagged values.
Because our theory does not generate any prior about the time structure of the Xt time
series, we estimate the full system using various time lags. We also use the rare cases of
lagged negative ￿ ows in the data as an instrument that proxies lagged values of the stock
of FDI.
4 Data
Our data is drawn from OECD reports (OECD, various years) on a sample of 24 OECD
countries, over the period from 1961 to 1998. The data on FDI ￿ ows are for the period
from 1981 to 1998 only. The FDI data are based on the OECD reports of FDI exports
16from 17 OECD source countries to 24 OECD countries.12
We employ 3-year averages, so that we have six periods (each consisting of 3 years).
The main variables we employ are: (1) standard country characteristics such as GDP or
GDP per-capita, population, educational attainment (as measured by average years of
schooling), language, ￿nancial risk rating, etc.; (2) s ￿ h source-host pairs, such as s ￿ h
FDI ￿ ows, geographical distance, common language (zero-one variable), s ￿ h ￿ ows of
goods, bilateral telephone tra¢ c per-capita as a proxy for informational distance, etc.
Appendix B provides more information on the data: Table B1 describes the list of the
24 countries in the sample, and whether observed in the sample (at least once) as a
source or host country (but most source countries do not interact more than with few
host countries), and Table B2 describes the data sources.
5 Estimation
Table 1 and Table 2 provide a ￿rst look at the direction and volume of FDI ￿ ows. While
s-h di⁄erences in GDP per capita look like good predictors of the direction of ￿ ows (the
exstensive margin; see Table 1), they are not correlated with the volume of FDI ￿ ows for
the subset of country paris with positive ￿ ows (the intensive margin; see Table 2).
We now turn to the estimation of the determinants of these ￿ ows. To estimate the
e⁄ect of GDP per capita, education, and ￿nancial risk ratings, on FDI ￿ ows, we now
control for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. The dependent variable in all the ￿ ow (gravity)
equations is the log of the FDI ￿ ow, de￿ ated by the unit value of manufactured goods
exports.
12However, the OECD reports accurately on all rich and poor countries that are a host to OECD FDI
exports. But data are missing on non-OECD countries as sources of FDI exports. This is the reason that
we we restrict our sample to the group of OECD countries, as potential source and host countries, among
themselves. In Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2003) we present also results for a 45-country sample,
which include also non-OECD countries as host to FDI originating from OECD countries. (see list of
countries in the broader sample in Table D.1, and robustness checks for our main analysis of the OECD
data set in Tables D.2, D.3, and D.4).
17We estimate the model under three alternative econometric procedures. As a bench-
mark, we ignore the selection equation (17), and simply estimate the gravity equation (11)
twice: (i) by treating all FDI ￿ ows in s-h pairs with no recorded FDI ￿ ows as ￿zeros￿ ;
(ii) excluding country pairs with no FDI ￿ ows.13 The rationale for inserting ￿zeros￿is as
follows. Generally, when one observes no FDI ￿ ows between a pair of countries, it could
be either because the two countries do not wish to have such ￿ ows, even in the absence
of ￿xed costs, or because setup costs are prohibitive for low ￿ ows, or because of mea-
surement errors. But in this benchmark case, which ignores setup costs and measurement
errors, s-h pairs with no FDI ￿ ows ￿truly￿indicate zero ￿ ows. This is why we assume a
neglegible value as a common low value for the value of the FDI ￿ ows for the no-￿ ows
s-h pairs.14 (All other positive ￿ ows have logarithmic value much exceeding zero.) The
estimation results for this benchmark case are shown in panel A of Table 3.
As a second benchmark, we treat all FDI ￿ ows that are below a certain low threshold
level (censor) as due to measurement errors, and employ a Tobit estimator. (Note that
this estimator is appropriate also in the case where the desired FDI ￿ ows were actually
negative, as in the case where a foreign subsidiary is liquidated, but were reported as
zeros.) We report the results in Panel B in Table 3, with three censor levels (lowest, 0.0
and 3.00).
Against these two benchmarks, the complete picture, and especially the role played by
the unobserved ￿xed set up costs, are brought to the limelight, when we employ the third
econometric procedure. This procedure, the Heckman selection method, jointly estimates
the maximum likelihood of the ￿ ow (gravity) equation and the selection equation. This
estimation accommodates both measurement errors and a possible existence of set up
costs.15 Consider a binary variable Di;j;t which is equal to 1 if country i exports positive
FDI ￿ ows to country j at time t: Assuming that setup cost are lower if country i already
13More precisely, the log of the FDI ￿ ow is set equal to log of the lowest observed ￿ ow between any s-h
country pair in the sample.
14We choose this value to be the lowest observe ￿ ow between any s-h country pair in the sample
15We have a few cases of negative ￿ ows in our sample. We control for that using a dummy variable in
the selection equation. See Appendix.
18invested in the past in country j, then Di;j;t￿k could serve as an instrument in the selection
equation (exclusion restriction). The results are reported in Panel C in Table 3.
Both OLS and Tobit estimations conform to the notion that the volume of FDI ￿ ows
is not a⁄ected by deviation from long-run averages in the source and host countries.
GDP per capita is also not signi￿cant in Heckman selection equation.16 Turning to the
e⁄ect of the host country education level, relative to the source country counterpart:
while educational gaps have no e⁄ect on the intensive margin, they do have a signi￿cant
e⁄ect on the extensive margin. To test whether the e⁄ect is non-linear we estimate the
paramters of interest, we provide OLS and Tobit estimates for di⁄erent ranges of FDI
￿ ows.17 The ￿rst two columns report the OLS coe¢ cients for all country-pairs and for
the sub-sample of country-pairs with positive FDI ￿ ows respectively. While the coe¢ cient
of the educational gaps is positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in the ￿rst column
the point estimate is substantial smaller and insigni￿cant when we estimate the e⁄ect of
educational attainements gaps within the sub-sample of country-pairs with positive FDI
￿ ows (intensive margin). This suggests that di⁄erences between source and host country
schooling levels are very important in explaining the di⁄erences between country-pairs
with no FDI ￿ ows (imputed ￿ ows) and country-pairs with "true" positive ￿ ows rather
than the variation among country-pairs with positive FDI ￿ ows.
The e⁄ect of education on the extensive margin is also well re￿ ected in our estimates
using the Tobit and Heckman models. We ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects in the Tobit and Heck-
man models. However, while the Tobit model predicts that FDI ￿ ows are positively
related to host-source di⁄erence in education levels, the Heckman model predicts that the
education level a⁄ect positively the likelihood of a non-zero source-host pair, but does not
in￿ uence the volume of FDI ￿ ows within the pair. Note that by imposing the no ￿xed
cost assumption (as in the Tobit model) we might mistakenly conclude that educational
gaps a⁄ect FDI volumes while in fact they a⁄ect only the extensive margin.
16Recall that in the estimation we control for country ￿xed e⁄ects. In Appendix C Table C.1 we present
also results of the estimation without controling for country ￿xed e⁄ects.
17We are indebted to Anil Kashyap for suggesting us to compare the coe¢ cients over di⁄erent volumes
of FDI ￿ ows.
19Source-country ￿nancial risk ratings is important in all models; but we ￿nd evidence
for the importance of the ratings only in Heckman￿ s selection equation. Improvements
in the source-country ￿nancial risk rating lead to a fall in the volume of FDI ￿ ows as
expected.18 In contrast to the OLS and Tobit models, where the e⁄ects of risk ratings is
only on the volume of FDI ￿ ows, in the Heckman model the e⁄ect is only on the likelihood
of a country becoming a source for FDI exports. The di⁄erence between the OLS and
Tobit models, on the one hand, and the Heckman model, on the other hand, is sharp when
we look at the e⁄ect of host country ￿nancial risk ratings. We ￿nd no e⁄ect whatsoever in
the OLS and Tobit models. In contrast, the Heckman model shows that an improvement
in the host-country ￿nancial risk ratings raises the volume of FDI ￿ ows.
As expected, and consistent with previous gravity equation literature, we ￿nd that
common language raises, and distance reduces the volume of FDI ￿ ows. Deviations of
population size from long run averages have no e⁄ect in the OLS and Tobit models. This
is not surprising when we look at the Heckman estimations: host-country population size
a⁄ects FDI ￿ ows negatively, but the selection equation coe¢ cient is positive. The source
country population size e⁄ect is insigni￿cant in all models.19
The coe¢ cient of the lagged FDI participation variable (Di;j;t￿2) in panel C is expressed
in terms of standard deviations of the unobserved pro￿ts. Thus, a pairs of countries which
already had positive FDI ￿ ows between them in period t ￿ 2 (six years before), have
the equivalent saving in setup cost of investment in period t; of a 0:7 standard deviation
of pro￿ts. Most importantly as a "smoking gun" for the existence of ￿xed costs in the
data, we note that: The correlation between the error terms in the ￿ ow and the selection
equations is negative and signi￿cant. This ￿nding, on which we further elaborate in the
next section , provides an additional evidence for the relevance of ￿xed set up costs.
In Table 4 we use past FDI liquidations as instruments. They are good instruments
18Note, from Tables C.1 in Appendix C, that without controling for country ￿xed e⁄ects the coe¢ cient
of source country ￿nancial risk rating is implausibly positive. Without country ￿xed e⁄ects, the coe¢ cient
may re￿ ect unobserved, time-invariant, country characteristics, rather than the e⁄ect of risk ratings on
FDI ￿ ows.
19Note from Tables C.1 in Appendix C, that without country ￿xed e⁄ects, the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant.
20because they are correlated positively with past FDI ￿ ows (Liquidations, by de￿nition,
are generated from existing stocks) but not apriori correlated with current FDI ￿ ows.
6 Interpretation
The ￿nding that there is a signi￿cant correlation (￿ ) between the error terms in the gravity
and participation equations indicates that the formation of an s￿h pair of countries and
the size of the FDI ￿ ow between this pair of countries are not independent processes.
Furthermore, with ￿ being negative, this correlation is consistent with the setup costs
hypothesis. If shocks drive jointly marginal productivity of capital and setup costs of
capital formation, then shocks to the participation equation must be negatively correlated
with shocks to the ￿ ow equation. That is, below-average productivity in a host country,
raising the likelihood of non-zero exports of FDI, is also associated with above-average
marginal productivity of capital, raising the ￿ ow of FDI to the country (if new investment
takes place at all).
If education, as measured by the average years of schooling is indeed a ￿good￿measure
for host￿ source country di⁄erences in human capital, then education levels are important
in predicting the volume of FDI ￿ ows. The Heckman estimations predict that, as a
country improves the education level, it would raise the likelihood of becoming a host
to FDI ￿ ows. Likewise, improvements in the host-country ￿nancial risk ratings (where
a higher rating indicates less risk) is important for her. It allows the country to solicit
inward FDI ￿ ows. As expected, as far as the source country is concerned, it is just the
opposite. Better risk ratings crowd out FDI out￿ ows, diverting the ￿ ows to domestic
investments. The likelihood of a country with better ratings to become a source for FDI
exports is therefore lessened.
217 Conclusion
The existence of setup costs of foreign direct investment must present foreign investors
with a two-fold decision: whether to establish subsidiaries in a speci￿c host country at
all, and how much to invest in the subsidiary, if they decide to establish it. Invoking this
simple idea we estimate in this paper a participation equation (the decision whether to
invest at all) jointly with a ￿ ow equation (the decision how much to invest).
The FDI model works as follows. A comparative advantage for the source country is
based on low setup costs of direct investment, relative to setup costs of domestic investors.
This allows foreign investors to bid up for investment projects in the host country. An
exogenous productivity shock in the host country may a⁄ect the decision of the FDI
investors whether to invest at all, and how much to invest, in opposite directions. For
instance, a positive productivity shock, ceteris paribus, improves both marginal and total
pro￿tability of new investment. But, it also raises the demand for labor and consequently
wages. The rise in wages, in turn, mitigates the initial rise in the marginal pro￿tability
and in the total pro￿tability of the new investment, through its adverse e⁄ect on variable
costs. However, the increase in wage costs does not completely o⁄set the initial rise
in the marginal and total productivity of new investments. As a result, the positive
productivity shock implies a net rise in the marginal pro￿tability of new investment. This
may not be the case with total pro￿tability. It is adversely a⁄ected by the rise in wages
not only through the increase in the variable costs, but also through the increase in the
wage bill associated with setup costs. Hence, it may well be the case that a positive
productivity shock increases the marginal productivity and lowers the total pro￿tability
of new investments, at the same time. Our model therefore provides a rationale for the
negative correlation between the residuals of the participation and ￿ ow equations, which
our econometric study is able to detect.
Empirical international trade and international ￿nance literature often fail to address
the endogeneity issue of the selection of countries into source-host country pairs. Source-
host country pairs with no recorded FDI ￿ ows are either ignored, treated as measurement
22errors, or as if they literally indicate zero ￿ ows. A standard procedure in the literature
is to treat all FDI ￿ ows that are below a certain low threshold level (censor) as due to
measurement errors, and to employ a Tobit estimator. Tobit estimation is indeed often
employed in the analysis of international ￿ ows of goods and capital. Evidently, the Tobit
model is the correct model under the null hypothesis of no setup costs. In such a case,
the error terms in the participation equation and in the ￿ ow equation are restricted to be
perfectly and positively correlated, in con￿ ict with empirical evidence and theory. The
Tobit estimator is also appropriate in the case where the desired FDI ￿ ows were actually
negative, as in the case where a foreign subsidiary is liquidated, but were nonetheless
reported as zeros. But the Tobit estimator fails in the presence of ￿xed costs.
To allow for the role played by unobserved ￿xed setup costs, which is at the center
stage of our theoretical model, we employ the Heckman selection method. We estimate
jointly the maximum likelihood of the volume of FDI ￿ ows (the gravity equation), and
the selection of countries into source-host country pairs (the participation equation). Ev-
idently, this estimation procedure accommodates both measurement errors and, crucially,
the possible existence of setup costs in the data. Importantly, if setup costs play an im-
portant role in determining whether a source country invests directly in a host country;
then we should expect a negative correlation between the error terms of the gravity and
the participation equation.
We do indeed ￿nd that the correlation between the error terms is negative in our
data set, indicating the importance of setup costs that governs the export of FDI in the
data. We ￿nd that the important predictors of the likelihood of which pair of countries
will be linked by host-source relationship selection are: (1) source country GDP per
capita, (2) di⁄erence in education levels (as measured by average years of schooling),
and (3) di⁄erences in ￿nancial risk ratings. These variables may also be interpreted as
good proxies for setup costs because they are expected to determine the technological
and ￿nancial ease by which a foreign subsidiary is established. Generally, these ￿ndings
support an existence of setup costs of foreign direct investment. Furthermore, the evidence
points to di⁄ering e⁄ects on FDI ￿ ows driven by the marginal productivity conditions and
23the setup cost conditions, as rationalized in our theoretical model. The paper also sheds
light on the importance of several covariates, such as income per capita, education, and
￿nancial risk ratings as key determinants of volume of FDI ￿ ows. While the coe¢ cients of
both the source- and host-country average years of schooling are positive and signi￿cant
in the ￿ ow equation, the magnitude of the source country coe¢ cient is more than twice
that of the host country. That is, the richer the source country is relative to the host
country, the larger are the FDI ￿ ows which occur between them. Our ￿ndings therefore
suggest that capital does ￿ ow from a high income country to a low income country, and
from countries with high average years of schooling to countries with low average years
of schooling, in the way suggested when one looks at marginal productivity conditions
alone. The characteristics of the host-source country pair with respect to the setup costs
are crucially important.
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268 Appendix A: A Productivity Shock


















Total di⁄erentiation of equations (2) and (3) with respect to AH (while still maintain-













AH(FKKFLL ￿ F 2
KL)
> 0; (A4)
In equations (A3) and (A4) we assume that capital and labor are substitute to each other
in the production function, namely that FKL > 0. (Recall also that FKKFLL ￿F 2
KL > 0,
FKK < 0, and FLL < 0, by the concavity of F.) Equations (A1) - (A3) imply that
@(FDI)=@AH > 0.
Thus, for a given wH, an increase in AH raises FDI, and K+ and V +.
However, when new investment is made, equation (A4) implies that a rise in AH
increases the demand for labor. When no new investment is made, it follows from







Thus, the demand for labor rises in this case as well.
279 Appendix B: Data Description
Table B1: Frequency of Source-Host Interactions by Countries
Country Source Host Country Source Host
Australia 0:43 0:41 Korea 0:09 0:39
Austria 0:66 0:38 Mexico 0:00 0:33
Belgium 0:03 0:56 Netherlands 0:68 0:54
Canada 0:62 0:41 New Zealand 0:00 0:34
Denmark 0:35 0:46 Norway 0:64 0:33
Finland 0:65 0:34 Portugal 0:00 0:49
France 0:94 0:52 Spain 0:02 0:51
Germany 0:98 0:54 Sweden 0:84 0:45
Greece 0:00 0:36 Switzerland 0:27 0:47
Ireland 0:00 0:49 Turkey 0:02 0:36
Italy 0:81 0:46 United Kingdom 0:91 0:58
Japan 0:96 0:41 United States 0:87 0:64
28Table B.2: Data Source
Variables: Source:
Import of Goods Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF
FDI In￿ ows International Direct Investment Database, OECD
Unit Value of Manufactured Exports World Economic Outlook, IMF
Population International Financial Statistics, IMF
Distance Shang Jin Wei￿ s Website: www.nber.org/~wei
Bilateral Telephone Tra¢ c Direction of Tra¢ c:
Trends in International Telephone Tari⁄s,
International Communication Union
International Telecommunications Union




ICRG index of ￿nancially Ashoka Mody, IMF
sound rating (inverse of ￿nancial risk)
2910 Appendix C: OECD Countries - extensions
Insert Table C.1
3011 Appendix D: OECD and Non-OECD Countries










































































































































































































Turkey 00000000 0.17 0000 0.33 000000000
Mexico 0 0000000000000000000000
Korea 0 0 000000 0 . 500000000 0.83 0 0 0 0.67 0
Portugal 0 0 0 00000000000000000000
Greece 0000 0000000000000000000
Spain 00000 000000000000 0 . 500000
New Zealand 000000 00000000000000000
Ireland 0000000 0000000000000000
Italy 0.83 0.17 0.5 1 1 1 0.33 1 1 1 0.67 0.5 1 1 1 0.83 1 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.83 1 0.67
U K 1111111 0.83 1 1 0.83 0.83 1 1 0.83 1 0.83 1 1 0.5 0.83 1 0.5
Canada 0 0.83 0.83 0.5 0.33 0.5 0.5 1 0.67 0.83 0.67 0 0.67 1 0.83 0.67 0.67 1 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67
Australia 0.17 0 0.83 0 0 0 0.83 0.5 0.83 1 0.83 0 0.5 0.5 0.83 0 0.67 1000 0 . 5 0.83
Finland 0.17 0 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.83 1 1 0.83 0.33 1 1 0.83 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.83 0.17 0.83
France 0.83 1 1 0.83 0.83 1 1 0.83 1111 0.83 111111 0 . 5111
Germany 1111111 0.83 1111 0.83 1 111111111
Netherlands 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.83 0.83 0.83 0 0.83 0.83 1 0.5 0.5 0.33 1 0.83 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.83 0.67 1
Sweden 1 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.5 0.83 0.67 1 0.67 0.83 1 1 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.67
Belgium 00000000000000000 0.67 00000
US 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.5 11111 0.83 1 0.83 1 1 0.83 0.83 1 0.5 0.67 0.83 1 1
Austria 0.67 0.67 0.5 0.67 0.5 0.67 0.17 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.67 0.5 0.83 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.33 0.33 0.17 1
Norway 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.83 0.17 0.67 0.5 0.83 0.5 0.83 0.67 0.5 0.83 0.83 0.5 0.83 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.5 0.83
Denmark 0 0 0 0.83 01000 0.83 0 0 0 0.83 1 1 0.83 0.83 0.83 0 0 0 0
Japan 0.83 1 1 1 0.83 1111111111111111 0.67 0.83
Switzerland 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0.17































































































































































Turkey 00000000 0.03 0000 0.02 000000000
Mexico 0 0000000000000000000000
Korea 0 0 000000 0.26 00000000 0.32 0 0 0 0.03 0
Portugal 0 0 0 00000000000000000000
Greece 0000 0000000000000000000
Spain 00000 000000000000 0.09 00000
New Zealand 000000 00000000000000000
Ireland 0000000 0000000000000000
Italy 0.66 0.29 0.13 3.64 1.53 2.51 0.05 5.73 2.7 0.49 0.19 0.26 2.24 0.42 12.2 0.75 20.1 0.41 1.15 0.15 0.27 0.08 7.82
UK 4.45 3.55 0.67 12 7.97 8.76 32.3 52.1 3.47 9.63 27.1 0.99 6.91 2.4 62.7 8.66 15.8 10.7 2.12 15.6 3.6 0.36 17.3
Canada 0 1.65 0.15 0.36 0.31 0.38 7.8 32.1 0.2 3.83 2.2 0 0.69 0.22 1.65 1.28 3.1 4 0.61 0.45 0.09 0.1 0.96
Australia 0 0 0.14 0 0 0 43.7 4.44 0.21 5.79 1.02 0 0.05 0.04 1.18 0 0.2 1.23 0 0 0 0.03 0.03
Finland 0.01 0 0 0.78 0 0.42 0 3.03 0.12 1.21 0.51 0.09 0.4 0.5 4.48 32.7 1.93 0.27 0.32 3.1 3.96 0.01 0.67
France 3.27 1.19 0.99 8.42 2.75 12.1 1.42 7.91 6.57 11 4.35 3.56 0.53 3.36 27.2 6.71 44.5 3.83 2.1 2.41 1.84 0.07 16.6
Germany 4.68 3.36 1.81 9.29 4.03 8.99 0.67 69 6.19 16.6 4.66 2.88 2.07 8.02 19.9 6.12 39.6 4.69 22.7 4.3 4.73 0.37 18.3
Netherlands 0.98 1.49 0.48 5.77 3.8 5.48 0 35.1 1.24 13.1 1.35 2.24 0.46 3.34 1.25 6.5 40 3.25 1.31 2.84 5.65 0.09 9.97
Sweden 0.18 0.46 0.27 0.78 0.11 0.79 0.14 21.1 0.52 4.31 0.31 0.43 35.4 1.56 0.56 9.93 2.73 0.99 0.6 15.4 6 0.02 3.34
Belgium 00000000000000000 0.49 00000
US 3.42 36.2 4.78 6.84 1.22 6.54 26.1 127 6.35 57 47 27.4 4.06 8 4.29 60.3 5.65 35.7 4.24 16.8 3.85 1.26 39.9
Austria 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.46 0.13 0.22 0.05 2.14 0.26 0.82 0.22 0.28 0.02 0.12 0.42 0.42 0.19 0.92 0.09 0.04 0.67 0 1.25
Norway 0.02 0 0 1.14 0.01 0.42 0.18 4.08 0.1 1.56 0.88 0.06 1.81 0.35 0.08 1.63 8.37 0.92 0.2 0.66 7.11 0 0.18
Denmark 0 0 0 0.81 01000 3 . 1000 0.39 0.21 2.37 7.52 0.9 0.21 0 0 0 0
Japan 1.75 4.15 7.71 1.2 0.54 2.69 16.7 19.1 0.82 19.1 7.66 34.2 0.64 2.65 1.29 28.3 0.26 18.2 15.7 0.97 3.32 0.16 4.48
Switzerland 0.68 0 0 0.88 1.39 0.44 0 5.5 0.51 4.88 1.3 1.43 1.64 0.63 1.02 3.23 2.84 3.3 1.01 1.42 0 0.51 0.01
Average 0.88 2.28 0.75 2.28 1.03 2.21 5.62 16.9 1.15 6.32 3.45 4.44 2.08 1.54 0.7 10.2 3.81 9.9 2.07 1.66 2.8 1.67 0.11 5.26Table 3:
Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection into Source-Host Pairs: 
OLS, Tobit Hekcman Maximum Likelihood,
Controlling for Country Fixed Effects,
OECD Countries only
Panel A: Panel B:  Panel C: 
OLS Tobit Correction Heckman selection
Sample: Low censored (in logs) Equation:
All^^ Intensive lowest 0 3 FDI Selection
Variables margin Flows
GDP per capita - host^ 0.260 0.445 -0.151 -0.040 0.107 0.330 -0.421
(0.997) (0.689) (2.294) (1.172) (1.016) (0.683) (0.769)
GDP per capita - source^ -0.653 0.640 -0.861 -0.174 -0.211 0.648 -0.338
(0.797) (0.576) (2.421) (1.231) (1.059) (0.558) (0.841)
Difference between source  0.367 0.018 0.855 0.413 0.321 -0.020 0.273
and host years of schooling (0.146)* (0.096) (0.282)** (0.145)** (0.126)* (0.101) (0.099)**
Common language 0.749 1.021 1.599 1.193 1.146 0.975 0.303
(0.250)** (0.146)** (0.319)** (0.162)** (0.139)** (0.130)** (0.133)*
Distance (in logs) -0.830 -0.677 -1.547 -1.003 -0.902 -0.633 -0.382
(0.138)** (0.095)** (0.188)** (0.095)** (0.082)** (0.092)** (0.088)**
Population - host^ 6.825 -1.943 15.543 5.511 3.269 -2.973 7.232
(3.888) (2.369) (7.776)* (3.959) (3.417) (2.373) (2.592)**
Population - source^ 5.023 -0.492 10.322 5.310 5.442 -1.289 2.013
(3.232) (3.029) (9.094) (4.648) (4.040) (2.938) (2.669)
Financial risk rating - host -0.029 0.045 -0.048 -0.006 0.006 0.050 -0.029
(0.027) (0.017)** (0.062) (0.032) (0.027) (0.017)** (0.021)
Financial risk rating - source -0.098 -0.035 -0.235 -0.137 -0.118 -0.027 -0.066
(0.025)** (0.026) (0.081)** (0.042)** (0.036)** (0.026) (0.025)**
 
Export of FDI flows from i to j 0.838
six years ago (=1 if yes) (0.124)**
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)
Inverse Mills ratio
Observations 2116 995 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116
Left-censored observations -- -- 1121 1141 1174 -- --
Uncensored observations -- -- 995 975 942
Note:
^ in logs
^^ Replacing the zeros by the lowest observed flow between any s-h country pair in the sample.
All specifications include year fixed-effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection into Source-Host Pairs: 
OLS, Tobit Hekcman Maximum Likelihood,
Controlling for Country Fixed Effects and Past Liquidations
OECD Countries only
Panel A: Panel B:  Panel C: 
OLS Tobit Correction Heckman selection
Sample: Low censored (in logs) Equation:
All^^ Intensive lowest 0 3 FDI Selection
Variables margin Flows
GDP per capita - host^ 0.219 0.440 -0.287 -0.104 0.064 0.350 -0.475
(0.987) (0.690) (2.288) (1.171) (1.016) (0.682) (0.759)
GDP per capita - source^ -0.543 0.584 -0.460 -0.017 -0.104 0.581 -0.202
(0.796) (0.580) (2.418) (1.232) (1.060) (0.562) (0.845)
Difference between source  0.386 0.012 0.917 0.438 0.338 -0.029 0.288
and host years of schooling (0.148)** (0.097) (0.282)** (0.145)** (0.126)** (0.103) (0.102)**
Common language 0.762 1.014 1.655 1.217 1.162 0.965 0.315
(0.254)** (0.146)** (0.319)** (0.162)** (0.139)** (0.129)** (0.138)*
Distance (in logs) -0.836 -0.674 -1.572 -1.013 -0.909 -0.629 -0.393
(0.139)** (0.095)** (0.187)** (0.095)** (0.082)** (0.092)** (0.091)**
Population - host^ 6.794 -1.967 15.401 5.460 3.237 -2.960 7.232
(3.894) (2.384) (7.756)* (3.956) (3.417) (2.393) (2.626)**
Population - source^ 5.395 -0.703 12.083 6.000 5.892 -1.536 2.828
(3.220) (3.032) (9.102) (4.659) (4.050) (2.933) (2.724)
Financial risk rating - host -0.028 0.045 -0.045 -0.005 0.007 0.050 -0.029
(0.027) (0.017)** (0.061) (0.032) (0.027) (0.017)** (0.021)
Financial risk rating - source -0.098 -0.034 -0.245 -0.141 -0.120 -0.025 -0.071
(0.024)** (0.026) (0.081)** (0.042)** (0.036)** (0.026) (0.025)**
 
Negative flows from I to j 0.661 -0.169 1.592 0.610 0.418 -0.243 0.505
three years ago (=1 if yes)^^^ (0.423) (0.152) (0.508)** (0.257)* (0.222) (0.155) (0.164)**
Export of FDI flows from i to j
six years ago (=1 if yes)
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)
Inverse Mills ratio
Observations 2116 995 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116
Left-censored observations -- -- 1121 1141 1174 -- --
Uncensored observations -- -- 995 975 942
Note:
^ in logs
^^ Replacing the zeros by the lowest observed flow between any s-h country pair in the sample.






(0.252)All specifications include year fixed-effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table C.1
Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection into Source-Host Pairs: 
OLS, Tobit Hekcman Maximum Likelihood, 
Without Country Fixed Effects,
OECD Countries only
Panel A: Panel B:  Panel C: 
OLS Tobit Correction Heckman selection
Sample: Low censored (in logs) Equation:
All^^ Intensive lowest 0 3 FDI Selection
Variables margin Flows
GDP per capita - host^ 0.164 0.366 0.084 0.232 0.192 0.365 -0.232
(0.313) (0.212) (0.455) (0.238) (0.208) (0.213) (0.119)
GDP per capita - source^ 3.923 0.905 9.034 4.611 3.857 0.630 1.166
(0.265)** (0.357)* (0.571)** (0.298)** (0.259)** (0.346) (0.152)**
Difference between source  -0.036 -0.050 -0.020 -0.040 -0.037 -0.053 0.012
and host years of schooling (0.052) (0.031) (0.080) (0.042) (0.037) (0.031) (0.020)
Common language 0.522 1.146 0.905 0.847 0.873 1.097 -0.038
(0.387) (0.241)** (0.405)* (0.210)** (0.181)** (0.231)** (0.110)
Distance (in logs) -0.780 -0.532 -1.482 -0.888 -0.802 -0.474 -0.128
(0.129)** (0.078)** (0.147)** (0.077)** (0.067)** (0.078)** (0.041)**
Population - host^ 0.720 0.662 1.348 0.882 0.812 0.614 0.089
(0.129)** (0.077)** (0.150)** (0.079)** (0.068)** (0.079)** (0.040)*
Population - source^ 2.117 0.799 3.278 1.908 1.686 0.680 0.378
(0.089)** (0.066)** (0.155)** (0.082)** (0.071)** (0.072)** (0.045)**
Financial risk rating - host 0.115 0.109 0.220 0.145 0.141 0.103 0.028
(0.031)** (0.020)** (0.051)** (0.027)** (0.024)** (0.020)** (0.013)*
Financial risk rating - source 0.050 0.086 0.262 0.144 0.132 0.077 0.026
(0.027) (0.027)** (0.066)** (0.035)** (0.031)** (0.027)** (0.015)
 
Export of FDI flows from i to j 1.613
six years ago (=1 if yes) (0.091)**
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)
Inverse Mills ratio
Observations 2116 995 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116
Left-censored observations -- -- 1121 1141 1174 -- --
Uncensored observations -- -- 995 975 942
Note:
^ in logs
^^ Replacing the zeros by the lowest observed flow between any s-h country pair in the sample.
All specifications include year fixed-effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection into Source-Host Pairs: 
OLS, Tobit Hekcman Maximum Likelihood, 
Controlling for Country Fixed Effects,
OECD and Non-OECD Countries.
Panel A: Panel B:  Panel C: 
OLS Tobit Correction Heckman selection
Sample: Low censored Equation:
All^^ Intensive lowest 0 3 FDI Selection
Variables margin Flows
GDP per capita - host^ 0.239 0.116 -1.463 -0.892 -0.367 0.148 -0.370
(0.175) (0.450) (1.189) (0.636) (0.468) (0.446) (0.383)
GDP per capita - source^ 0.066 0.437 0.637 0.577 0.619 0.388 0.399
(0.083) (0.457) (1.993) (0.982) (0.624) (0.446) (0.707)
Difference between source  0.211 0.116 0.708 0.388 0.188 0.083 0.227
and host years of schooling (0.064)** (0.086) (0.237)** (0.120)** (0.084)* (0.088) (0.075)**
Common language 0.383 0.846 1.647 1.094 0.879 0.792 0.301
(0.133)** (0.123)** (0.257)** (0.126)** (0.080)** (0.111)** (0.099)**
Distance (in logs) -0.633 -0.800 -1.716 -1.113 -0.803 -0.745 -0.413
(0.068)** (0.077)** (0.149)** (0.073)** (0.046)** (0.074)** (0.073)**
Population - host^ 2.961 1.585 17.966 7.797 3.452 0.577 5.396
(0.768)** (1.355) (3.704)** (1.872)** (1.298)** (1.359) (1.229)**
Population - source^ -2.338 1.012 -8.367 -1.779 2.949 1.352 -5.542
(0.459)** (2.561) (7.509) (3.736) (2.532) (2.480) (2.305)*
Financial risk rating - host -0.014 0.036 -0.027 0.001 0.019 0.038 -0.020
(0.008) (0.011)** (0.037) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011)** (0.012)
Financial risk rating - source -0.058 -0.056 -0.261 -0.162 -0.120 -0.044 -0.070
(0.007)** (0.025)* (0.070)** (0.035)** (0.024)** (0.025) (0.021)**
 
Export of FDI flows from i to j 0.721
six years ago (=1 if yes) (0.099)**
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)
Inverse Mills ratio
Observations 6724 1482 6724 6724 6724 6724 6724
Left-censored observations -- -- 5242 5301 5605 -- --
Uncensored observations -- -- 1482 1423 1119
Note:
^ in logs
^^ Replacing the zeros by the lowest observed flow between any s-h country pair in the sample.
All specifications include year fixed-effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection into Source-Host Pairs: 
OLS, Tobit Hekcman Maximum Likelihood, 
Without Country Fixed Effects,
OECD and Non-OECD Countries.
Panel A: Panel B:  Panel C: 
OLS Tobit Correction Heckman selection
Sample: Low censored Equation:
All^^ Intensive lowest 0 3 FDI Selection
Variables margin Flows
GDP per capita - host^ 0.602 0.811 1.479 0.990 0.774 0.757 0.040
(0.089)** (0.095)** (0.213)** (0.107)** (0.073)** (0.095)** (0.050)
GDP per capita - source^ 1.965 0.764 9.615 4.736 2.573 0.478 1.203
(0.084)** (0.306)* (0.453)** (0.225)** (0.146)** (0.298) (0.099)**
Difference between source  -0.131 -0.087 -0.153 -0.113 -0.079 -0.085 -0.001
and host years of schooling (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.064)* (0.032)** (0.022)** (0.026)** (0.016)
Common language 0.348 1.057 1.224 0.967 0.951 1.006 0.021
(0.149)* (0.172)** (0.320)** (0.159)** (0.104)** (0.165)** (0.079)
Distance (in logs) -0.621 -0.496 -1.660 -0.933 -0.625 -0.426 -0.136
(0.085)** (0.066)** (0.133)** (0.066)** (0.043)** (0.066)** (0.034)**
Population - host^ 0.470 0.681 1.680 1.005 0.729 0.616 0.151
(0.063)** (0.063)** (0.119)** (0.060)** (0.040)** (0.064)** (0.030)**
Population - source^ 1.483 0.857 3.859 2.125 1.364 0.707 0.433
(0.058)** (0.054)** (0.125)** (0.063)** (0.043)** (0.062)** (0.035)**
Financial risk rating - host 0.047 0.063 0.202 0.116 0.084 0.055 0.021
(0.009)** (0.010)** (0.028)** (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.007)**
Financial risk rating - source 0.037 0.106 0.339 0.172 0.127 0.093 0.035
(0.007)** (0.024)** (0.050)** (0.026)** (0.018)** (0.024)** (0.008)**
 
Export of FDI flows from i to j 1.663
six years ago (=1 if yes) (0.075)**
Correlation (Ui,j, Vi,j)
Inverse Mills ratio
Observations 6724 1482 6724 6724 6724 6724 6724
Left-censored observations -- -- 5242 5301 5605 -- --
Uncensored observations -- -- 1482 1423 1119
Note:
^ in logs
^^ Replacing the zeros by the lowest observed flow between any s-h country pair in the sample.
All specifications include year fixed-effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
-0.382
(0.062)
-0.618
(0.111)